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Haynsworth and Carswell: A New
Senate Standard of Excellence
By A. Mrrc

It McCoNN=, JR.*

All politicians have read history; but one might say that
they read it only in order to learn from it how to repeat the
same calamities all over again.

Paul Valery

With the confirmation of Judge Harry A. Blackmun by the
United States Senate on May 12, 1970, the American public
witnessed the end of an era, possibly the most interesting period
in Supreme Court history. In many respects, it was not a proud
time in the life of the Senate or, for that matter, in the life of the
Presidency. Mistakes having a profound effect upon the American people were made by both institutions.

The Supreme Court of the United States is the most prestigious institution in our nation and possibly the world. For many
years public opinion polls have revealed that the American
people consider membership on the Court the most revered
position in our society. This is surely an indication of the respect
Aurnoi's Nots. This article represents the thoughts and efforts of over a year's
involvement in the Senate with three Presidential nominations to the Supreme
Court. The experiences were possible only because of the author's association
with the Junior Senator from Kentucky, Marlow W. Cook, and the conclusions
drawn and suggestions made, many of which may be found in a speech by the
Senator of May 15, 1970, represent, in large part, a joint effort by the two of
them to evolve a meaningful standard by which the Senate might judge future
Supreme Court nominees.
Only rarely does a staff assistant to a Member of Congress receive the
opportunity to express himself by publication or speech on an issue of public
significance. For the freedom and encouragement to do so in this instance, the
author is grateful to Senator Cook.
* Chief Legislative Assistant to Marlow W. Cook, United States Senator from
Kentucky; B.A., cum laude, 1964, University of Louisville; J.D., 1967, University of
Kentucky. While attending the College of Law he was President of the Student Bar
Association, a member of the Moot Court Team, and winner of the McEwen
Award as the Outstanding Oral Advocate in his class. He was admitted to the
Kentucky Bar in September of 1967 at which time he became associated with
the Louisville, Kentucky law firm of Segal, Isenberg, Sales and Stewart.
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our people hold for the basic fabric of our stable society-the rule
of law.
To the extent that it has eroded respect for this highest of our
legal institutions, the recent controversial period has been unfortunate. There could not have been a worse time for an attack
upon the men who administer justice in our country than in the
past year, when tensions and frustrations about our foreign and
domestic policies literally threatened to tear us apart. Respect
for law and the administration of justice has, at various times in
our history, been the only buffer between chaos and order. And
this past year this pillar of our society has been buffeted once
again by the winds of both justified and unconscionable attacks.
It is time the President and the Congress helped to put an end
to the turmoil.
The President's nomination of Judge Harry Blackmun and
the Senate's responsible act of confirmation is a first step. But
before moving on into what hopefully will be a more tranquil
period for the High Court, it is useful to review the events of
the past year for the lessons they hold. It may be argued that
the writing of recent history is an exercise in futility and that
only the passage of time will allow a dispassionate appraisal of
an event or events of significance. This may well be true for the
author who was not present and involved in the event. However,
for the writer who is a participant the lapse of time serves only
to cloud the memory. Circumstances placed a few individuals
in the middle of the controversies of the past year. In the case
of the author the experience with the Supreme Court nominees
of the past year was the direct result of Senator Marlow W.
Cook's election in 1968 and subsequent appointment to the
powerful Senate Judiciary Committee. This committee appointment by the Senate Republican leadership, and Supreme Court
nominations by President Nixon, brought about an initial introduction to the practical application of Article II, section 2 of
the Constitution which reads, in part, that the President shall
"nominate and by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
shall appoint.., judges of the Supreme Court."
The purpose of this article is to draw upon the events of the
past year in suggesting some conclusions and making some
recommendations about what the proper role of the Senate
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should be in advising and consenting to Presidential nominations
to the Supreme Court. The motivations of the Executive will be
touched upon only periferally. 1
Initiated by Senator Robert P. Griffin, Republican of Michigan,
the senatorial attack upon the Johnson nomination of Justice
Abe Fortas to be Chief Justice which resulted in blocking the
appointment had set a recent precedent for senatorial questioning
in an area which had largely become a Presidential prerogative
in the twentieth century. The most recent period of senatorial
assertion had begun. But there had been other such periods
and a brief examination of senatorial action on prior nominations
is valuable because it helps put the controversial nominations of
the past two years in proper perspective.
Joseph P. Harris, in his book, The Advice and Consent of the
Senate, sums up the history of Supreme Court nominations by
pointing out that approximately one-fifth of all appointments have
been rejected by the Senate. From 1894 until the Senate's
rejection of Judge Haynsworth, however, there was only one
rejection. In the preceding 105 years, 20 of the 81 nominees had
been rejected. Four of Tyler's nominees, three of Fillmore's, and
three of Grant's were disapproved during a period of bitter
partisanship over Supreme Court appointments. Harris concludes
of this era:
Appointments were influenced greatly by political consideration, and the action of the Senate was fully as political as
that of the President. Few of the rejections of Supreme Court

nominations in this period can be ascribed to any lack of
qualifications on the part of the nominees; for the most part

between the President
they were due to political differences
2
and a majority of the Senate.
The first nominee to be rejected was former Associate Justice
John Rutledge, of South Carolina. He had been nominated for
the Chief Justiceship by President George Washington. The
eminent Supreme Court historian Charles Warren reports that
Rutledge was rejected essentially because of a speech he had
1 For recent articles discussing the role of the Executive see Bickel, The
Making of Supreme Court Justices, 53 THE NEw LEADER, May 25, 1970, at 14-18;
Commager, Choosing Supreme Court Judges, 162 THE NEw REPuBr.ac, May 2,
1970,2 at 13-16.
J HAmus, THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF T=E SENATE 302-03 (1953).
.
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made in Charleston in opposition to the Jay Treaty. Although
his opponents in the predominantly Federalist Senate also started
a rumor about his mental condition, a detached appraisal reveals
his rejection was based entirely upon his opposition to the
Treaty. Verifying this observation, Thomas Jefferson wrote of
the incident:
The rejection of Mr. Rutledge is a bold thing, for they cannot
pretend any objection to him but his disapprobation of the
treaty. It is, of course, a declaration that they will receive
none but tories hereafter into any department of Government.3
On December 28, 1835, President Andrew Jackson sent to
the Senate the name of Roger B. Taney, of Maryland, to succeed
John Marshall as Chief Justice. As Taney had been Jackson's
Secretary of the Treasury and Attorney General, the Whigs in
the Senate strongly opposed him. Daniel Webster wrote of the
nomination: "Judge Story thinks the Supreme Court is gone and I
think so, too."4 Warren reports that
. . . the Bar throughout the North, being largely Whig,
entirely ignored Taney's eminent legal qualifications, and his
brilliant legal career, during which he had shared . . . the
leadership of the Maryland Bar and had attained high rank
at the Supreme Court Bar, both before and after his service
as Attorney General of the United States.5
Taney was approved, after more than two months of spirited
debate, by a vote of 29 to 15 over vehement opposition including
Calhoun, Clay, Crittenden, and Webster. He had actually been
rejected the year before but was re-submitted by a stubborn
Jackson. 6
History has judged Chief Justice Taney as among the most
outstanding of American jurists, his tribulations prior to confirmation being completely overshadowed by an exceptional career. A contrite and tearful Clay related to Taney after viewing
his work on the Court for many years:
3

1 C. WAmmN, THE

1935).

SuPREME

COURT iN U.S. HMSToay 134-35 (rev. ed.

42 C. WARREN, THE SUPREEmE COURT i U.S. I-sToRY 10 (rev. ed. 1935).

5Id. at 12.
6 Id. at 13-15.

19701

A NEW SENATE STANDARD oF ExcELLENcE

Mr. Chief Justice, there was no man in the land who regretted
your appointment to the place you now hold more than I did;
there was no Member of the Senate who opposed it more than
I did; but I have come to say to you, and I say it now in
parting, perhaps for the last time-I have witnessed your
judicial career, and it is due to myself and due to you that I
should say what has been the result, that I am satisfied now
that no man in the United States could have been selected
more abundantly able to wear the ermine which Chief
7
Justice Marshall honored.
It is safe to conclude that purely partisan politics played the
major role in Senate rejections of Supreme Court nominees during
the nineteenth century. The cases of Rutledge and Taney have
been related only for the purpose of highlighting a rather undistinguished aspect of the history of the Senate.
No implication should be drawn from the preceding that
Supreme Court nominations in the twentieth century have been
without controversy because certainly this has not been the case.
However, until Haynsworth only one nominee had been rejected
in this century. President Woodrow Wilson's nomination of Louis
D. Brandeis and the events surrounding it certainly exhibit many
of the difficulties experienced by Judges Haynsworth and Carswell as Brandeis failed to receive the support of substantial and
respected segments of the legal community. William Howard
Taft, Elihu Root, and three past presidents of the American Bar
Association signed the following statement:
The undersigned feel under the painful duty to say... that
in their opinion, taking into view the reputation, character
and professional career of Mr. Louis D. Brandeis, he is not
a fit person to be a Member of the Supreme Court of the
U.S. 8
Hearings were conducted by a Senate Judiciary subcommittee
for a period of over four months, were twice-reopened, and the
record of the hearings consisted of over 1500 pages."
The nomination of Brandeis, like the nomination of Haynsworth, Carswell and to some extent Fortas (to be Chief Justice)
7Id. at 16
8J. HARpd, supra note 2, at 99.

9id.
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quickly became a cause celebre for the opposition party in the
Senate. The political nature of Brandeis' opposition is indicated
by the fact that the confirmation vote was 47 to 22; three
Progressives and all but one Democrat voted for Brandeis and
every Republican voted against him.1
The basic opposition to Brandeis, like the basic opposition
to Haynsworth and Carswell, was born of a belief that the
nominee's views were not compatible with the prevailing views
of the Supreme Court at that time. However, the publicly
stated reasons for opposing Brandeis, just as the publicly stated
reasons for opposing Carswell and Haynsworth, were that they
fell below certain standards of "fitness."
Liberals in the Senate actively opposed the nominations to
the Court of Harlan Fiske Stone in 1925 and Charles Evans
Hughes five years later, for various reasons best summed up as
opposition to what opponents predicted would be their conservatism. However, it was generally conceded by liberals subsequently that they had misread the leanings of both nominees,
who tended to side with the Progressives on the Court throughout
their tenures."No review of the historic reasons for opposition to Supreme
Court nominees, even as cursory as this one has been, would be
complete without mention of the Parker nomination. Judge John
J. Parker of North Carolina, a member of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, was designated for the Supreme
Court by President Hoover in 1930. Harris reports that opposition to Parker was essentially threefold. He was alleged to be
anti-labor, unsympathetic to Negroes, and his nomination was
12
thought to be politically motivated.
Opposition to Haynsworth and Carswell followed an almost
identical pattern except that Judges Parker and Carswell were
spared the charges of ethical impropriety to which Judge Haynsworth was subjected. All three nominees, it is worthy of note
for the first time at this point, were from the Deep South.
As this altogether too brief historical review has demonstrated,
the Senate has in its past, virtually without exception, based its
'Old.at 113.
11 Id. at 115-27.

121d. at

127-32.
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objections to nominees for the Supreme Court on party or philosophical considerations. Most of the time, however, Senators
sought to hide their political objections beneath a veil of charges
about fitness, ethics and other professional qualifications. In
recent years, Senators have accepted, with a few exceptions, the
notion that the advice and consent responsibility of the Senate
should mean an inquiry into qualifications and not politics or
ideology. In the Brandeis case, for example, -the majority chose
to characterize their opposition as objecting to his fitness not his
liberalism. So there was a recognition that purely political opposition should not be openly stated because it would not be accepted
as a valid reason for opposing a nominee. The proper inquiry
was judged to be the matter of fitness. In very recent times it
has been the liberals in the Senate who have helped to codify
this standard. During the Kennedy-Johnson years it was argued
to conservatives in regard to appointments the liberals liked that
the ideology of the nominee was of no concern to the Senate. Most
agree that this is the proper standard, but it should be applied
in a nonpartisan manner to conservative southern nominees as
well as northern liberal ones. Even though the Senate has at
various times made purely political decisions in its consideration
of Supreme Court nominees, certainly it could not be successfully
argued that this is an acceptable practice. After all, if political
matters were relevant to senatorial consideration it might be
suggested that a constitutional amendment be introduced giving
to the Senate rather than the President the right to nominate
Supreme Court Justices, as many argued during the Constitutional
Convention.
A pattern emerges running from Rutledge and Taney through
Brandeis and Parker up to and including Haynsworth and Carswell in which the Senate has employed deception to achieve its
partisan goals. This deception has been to ostensibly object to a
nominee's fitness while in fact the opposition is born of political
expedience.
In summary, the inconsistent and sometimes unfair behavior
of the Senate in the past and in the recent examples which follow
do not lead one to be overly optimistic about its prospects for
rendering equitable judgments about Supreme Court nominees
in the future.
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CLEIMENT F. HAYNSWoRTH, JR.: INSENSIMVE Ox VicTMnZE?

For the great majority of mankind are satisfied with appearance, as though they were realities, and are often more
influenced by the things that seem than by those that are.
(Author unknown)
The resignation of Justice Abe Fortas in May of 1969 following
on the heels of the successful effort of the Senate the previous
Fall in stalling his appointment to be Chief Justice, (the nomination was withdrawn after an attempt to invoke cloture on Senate
debate was defeated) intensified the resolve of the Senate to
reassert what it considered to be its rightful role in advising and
consenting to presidential nominations to the Supreme Court.
It was in this atmosphere of senatorial questioning and public
dismay over the implications of the Fortas resignation that President Nixon submitted to the Senate the name of Judge Clement
F. Haynsworth, Jr., of South Carolina, to fill the Fortas vacancy.
Completely aside from Judge Haynsworth's competence, which
was never successfully challenged, he had a number of problems
from a political point of view, given the Democrat-controlled Congress. Since he was from South Carolina his nomination was
immediately considered to be an integral part of the so-called
southern strategy which was receiving considerable press comment at that time. His South Carolina residence was construed
as conclusive proof that he was a close friend of the widelycriticized senior Senator from that state, Strom Thurmond, whom,
in fact, he hardly knew. Discerning Senators found offensive such
an attack against the nominee rather than the nominator, since
the southern strategy would be only in the latter's mind, if it
existed. Nevertheless, this put the nomination in jeopardy from
the outset.
In addition, labor and civil rights groups mobilized to oppose
Judge Haynsworth on philosophical grounds. Some of the proponents of the Judge, including their acknowledged leader
Senator Cook, might have had some difficulty on these grounds
had they concluded that the philosophy of the nominee was
relevant to the Senate's consideration. Senator Cook expressed
the proper role of the Senate well in a letter to one of his constituents, a black student at the University of Louisville who was
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disgruntled over his support for the nominee. It read in pertinent
part as follows:
First, as to the question of his [Haynsworth's] view on
labor and civil rights matters, I find myself in essential disagreement with many of his civil rights decisions-not that they
in any way indicate a pro-segregationist pattern, but that they
do not form the progressive pattern I would hope for. However, as Senator Edward Kennedy pointed out to the conservatives as he spoke for the confirmation of Justice Thurgood Marshall,
'I believe it is recognized by most Senators that we are not
charged with the responsibility of approving a man to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court only if his views
always coincide with our own. We are not seeking a nominee
for the Supreme Court who will express the majority view of
the Senate on every given issue, or on a given issue of fumdamental importance. We are interested really in knowing
whether the nominee has the background, experience, qualifications, temperament and integrity to handle this most
sensitive, important, responsible job.'
Most Senators, especially of moderate and liberal persuasion, have agreed that while the appointment of judge
Haynsworth may have been unfortunate from a civil rights
point of view, the ideology of the nominee is the responsibility of the President. The Senate's judgment should be
made, therefore, solely upon grounds of qualifications. As I
agree with Senator Kennedy and others that this is the only
relevant inquiry, I have confined my judgment of this nominee's fitness to the issue of ethics of qualifications? 3
...

The ethical questions which were raised about Judge Haynsworth were certainly relevant to the proper inquiry of the Senate
into qualifications for appointment. Also distinction and competence had a proper bearing upon the matter of qualifications,
but Judge Haynsworth's ability was, almost uniformly, conceded
by his opponents and thus was never a real factor in the debate.
A sloppy and hastily drafted document labelled the "Bill of
Particulars" against Judge Haynsworth was issued on October 8,
1969, by Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, who had become the
3

1

Letter from Senator Marlow W. Cook to Charles Hagan, October 21, 1969.
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de facto leader of the anti-Haynsworth forces during the hearings
on the nomination before the Judiciary Committee the previous
month. This contained, in addition to several cases in which
it had been alleged during the hearings that Judge Haynsworth
should have refused to sit, several extraneous and a few inaccurate assertions which were swiftly rebutted two days later by
Senator Cook in a statement aptly labelled the "Bill of Corrections." This preliminary sparring by the leaders of both sides
raised all the issues in the case but only the relevant and significant allegations will be discussed here, those which had a real
impact upon the Senate's decision.'
First, it was essential to determine what, if any, impropriety
Judge Haynsworth had committed. For the Senator willing to
make a judgment upon the facts this required looking to those
facts. The controlling statute in situations where federal judges
might potentially disqualify themselves is 28 U.S.C § 455 which
reads:
Any Justice or Judge of the United States shall disqualify
himself in any case in which he has a substantial interest, has
been of counsel, is or has been a material witness, or is so
related to or connected with any party or his attorney as to
render it improper, in his opinion for him to sit on the trial,
appeal, or other proceeding therein. [Emphasis added.]
Also pertinent is Canon 29 of the American Bar Association
Canons of Judicial Ethics which provides:
A judge should abstain from performing or taking part in
any judicial act in which his personal interests are involved.
Formal Opinion 170 of the American Bar Association construing
Canon 29 advises that a judge should not sit in a case in which
he owns stock in a party litigant.
The first instance cited by Judge Haynsworth's opponents as
an ethical violation was the much celebrated labor case, Darling1
4For complete discussion of all issues raised by the 'Bill of Particulars"
see speech of Senator Marlow W. Cook, 115 Cong. Rec. S12314-20 (daily ed. Oct
13, 1969). See also REPOnT or SENAT JUmicIAEy CounrrX- oN = NozmvAREPoRT No. 91-12, 91st Cong.,
TiON or Cr mENT F. HAYNSWORTE, JR., ExECUT
1st Sess. (1969).
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ton Manufacturing Co. v. NLRB, 15 argued before and decided
by the Fourth Circuit in 1963. The Judge sat in this case contrary
to what some of his Senate opponents felt to have been proper.
The facts were that Judge Haynsworth had been one of the
original incorporators, seven years before he was appointed to
the bench, of a company named Carolina Vend-A-Matic which
had a contract to supply vending machines to one of DeeringMillildn's (one of the litigants) plants. In 1957, when Judge
Haynsworth went on the bench, he orally resigned as Vice President of the Company but continued to serve as a director until
October, 1963, at which time he resigned his directorship in compliance with a ruling of the U.S. Judicial Conference. During
1963, the year the case was decided, Judge Haynsworth owned
one-seventh of the stock of Carolina Vend-A-Matic.
Suffice it to say that all case law in point, on a situation in
which a judge owns stock in a company which merely does
business with one of the litigants before him, dictates that the
sitting judge not disqualify himself. And certainly the Canons
do not address themselves to such a situatiohi. As John P. Frank,
the acknowledged leading authority on the subject of judicial
disqualification testified before the Judiciary Committee:
It follows that under the standard federal rule Judge Haynsworth had no alternative whatsoever. He was bound by the
principle of the cases. It is a Judge's duty to refuse to sit when
he is disqualified, but it is equally his duty to sit when there
is no valid reason not to... I do think it is perfectly clear
under the authority that there was virtually no choice whatsoever for Judge Haynsworth except to participate in that
case and do his job as well as he could.16
This testimony by Mr. Frank was never refuted as no one recognized as an authority on the subject was discovered who held a
contrary opinion.
The second situation of significance which arose during the
Haynsworth debate concerned the question of whether Judge
15 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
16 Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr. of South Carolina
to be Associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 115-16 (1969).
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Haynsworth should have sat in three cases in which he owned
stock in a parent corporation where one of the litigants before
him was a wholly owned subsidiary of the parent corporation.
These cases were Farrowv. Grace Lines, Inc.," Donohue V. Maryland Casualty Co.,18 and Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baldwin."9

Consistently ignored during the outrage expressed over his
having sat in these cases were the pleas of many of the Senators
supporting the nomination to look to the law to find the answer
to the question of whether Judge Haynsworth should have disqualified himself in these situations. Instead, the opponents decided, completely independent of the controlling statutes and
canons, that the Judge had a "substantial interest" in the outcome
of the litigation and should, therefore, have disqualified himself.
Under the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 455, Judge Haynsworth clearly
had no duty to step aside. Two controlling cases in a situation
where the judge actually owns stock in one of the litigants, not
as here where the stock was owned in the parent corporation,
are Kinnear Weed Corp. v. Humble Oil and Refining Co.20 and
Lampert v. Hollis Music, Inc. 1 These cases interpret "substantial
interest" to mean "substantial interest" in the outcome of the
case, not "substantial interest" in the litigant. And here Judge
Haynsworth not only did not have a "substantial interest" in the
outcome of the litigation, he did not even have a "substantial
interest" in the litigant, his stock being a small portion of the
shares outstanding in the parent corporation of one of the litigants.
There was, therefore, clearly no duty to step aside under the
statute. It is interesting to note that joining in the KinnearWeed
decision were Chief Judge Brown and Judge Wisdom of the
Fifth Circuit whom Joseph Rauh, a major critic of the Haynsworth nomination, had stated at the hearings on the nomination
"would have been heroic additions to the Supreme Court."22
But was there a duty to step aside in these parent-subsidiary
cases under Canon 29? The answer is again unequivocally No.
17 381 F.2d 380 (4th Cir. 1967).

18 363 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1966).
39 357 F.2d 228 (4th Cir. 1966).
20403 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1968).
21
105 F. Supp. 3 (E.D.N Y. 1952).
22
Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., supra note 15,
at 469.
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The only case law available construing language similar to that
of Canon 29 is found in the disqualification statute of a state. In
Central Pacific Railroad Co. v. Superior Court,23 the state court

held that ownership of stock in a parent corporation did not
require disqualification in litigation involving a subsidiary. Admittedly, this is only a state case, but significantly there is no
federal case law suggesting any duty to step aside where a judge
merely owns stock in the parent where the subsidiary is before
the court. Presumably, this is because such a preposterous challenge has never occurred even to the most ingenious lawyer
until the opponents of Judge Haynsworth created it. Therefore,
Judge Haynsworth violated no existing standard of ethical behavior in the parent-subsidiary cases except that made up for the
occasion by his opponents to stop his confirmation.
There was one other accusation of significance during the
Haynsworth proceedings which should be discussed. It concerned
the Judge's actions in the case of Brunswick Corp. v. Long.24
The facts relevant to this consideration were as follows: on November 10, 1967, a panel of the Fourth Circuit, including Judge
Haynsworth, heard oral argument in the case and immediately
after argument voted to affirm the decision by the District Court.
Judge Haynsworth, on the advice of his broker, purchased 1,000
shares of Brunswick on December 20, 1967. Judge Winter, to
whom the writing of the opinion had been assigned on November
10, the day of the decision, circulated his opinion on December
27. Judge Haynsworth noted his concurrence on January 3, 1968,
and the opinion was released on February 2. Judge Haynsworth
testified that he completed his participation, in terms of the
decision-making process, on November 10, 1967, approximately
six weeks prior to the decision to buy stock in Brunswick. Judge
Winter confirmed that the decision had been substantially completed on November 10.25 Therefore, it could be strongly argued
that Judge Haynsworth's participation in Brunswick terminated
on November 10. However, even if it were conceded that he sat
while he owned Brunswick stock it is important to remember
23296 P. 883 (Cal. 1931).

24
392 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1968).
25
Hearings on Nomination of Clement F. Haynsworth, Jr., supra note 15, at
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that neither the statute nor the canons require an automatic
disqualification, although Opinion 170 so advises. And the facts
show that his holdings were so miniscule as to amount neither
to a "substantial interest" in the outcome of the litigation under
28 U.S.C. § 455 or to a "substantial interest" in the litigant itself.
Clearly, once again, Judge Haynsworth was guilty of no ethical
impropriety.

As mentioned earlier there were other less substantial charges
by Haynsworth opponents but they were rarely used by opponents to justify opposition. These which have been mentioned
were the main arguments used to deny confirmation. It is apparent to any objective student of this episode that Haynsworth
violated no existing standard of ethical conduct, just those made
up for the occasion by those who sought to defeat him for political
gain. As his competence and ability were virtually unassailable,
the opponents could not attack him for having a poor record of

accomplishment or for being mediocre (an adjective soon to
become famous in describing a subsequent nominee for the
vacancy). The only alternative available was to first, create a
new standard of conduct; second, apply this standard to the
nominee retroactively making him appear to be ethically insensitive; third, convey the newly-created appearance of impropriety
to the public by way of a politically hostile press (hostile due to
an aversion to the so-called southern strategy of which Haynsworth was thought to be an integral part); and fourth, prolong
the decision upon confirmation for a while until the politicians
in the Senate reacted to an aroused public. Judge Haynsworth
was defeated on November 21, 1969, by a vote of 55-45. Ap-

pearance had prevailed over reality. Only two Democrats outside
the South (and one was a conservative-Bible of Nevada) supported the nomination, an indication of the partisan issue it had
become, leading the Washington Post, a lukewarm Haynsworth
supporter, to editorially comment, the morning after the vote:
The rejection, despite the speeches and comments on Capitol
Hill to the contrary, seems to have resulted more from ideological and plainly political considerations than from ethical
ones. It is impossible to believe that all Northern liberals and
all Southern conservatives have such dramatically different
ethical standards.

1970]

A NEW SENATE STADAIMD OF ExcExLmcE

CARSWELL: WAS HE QuALiFED?

Even if he was mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges
and people and lawyers. They are entitled to a little representation, areuft they, and a little chance? We cadft have all
Brandeises and Cardozos and Frankfurtersand stuff like that
there.

Senator Roman Hruska
March 16, 1970

The United States Senate began the new year in no mood
to reject another nomination of the President to the Supreme
Court. It would take an incredibly poor nomination, students of
the Senate concluded, to deny the President his choice in two
successive instances. Circumstances, however, brought forth just
such a nomination.
Subsequent to the defeat of Judge Haynsworth, President
Nixon sent to the Senate in January of 1970 the name of Judge
G. Harrold Carswell, of Florida and the Fifth Circuit. Judge
Carswell had been nominated to the Circuit Court by President
Nixon the year before, after serving 12 years on the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Florida at Tallahassee to which
he had been appointed by President Eisenhower.
He, too, faced an initial disadvantage in that he came from
the south and was also considered by the press to be a part of
the southern strategy. This should have been, as it should have
been for Haynsworth, totally irrelevant to considerations of the
man and his ability, but it was a factor and it immediately mobilized the not insignificant anti-south block in the Senate.
Many were troubled at the outset of the hearings about
reports of a "white supremacy" speech Carswell had made as a
youthful candidate for the legislature in Georgia in 1948, and
later by allegations that he had supported efforts to convert a
previously all-white public golf course to an all-white private
26
country club in 1956, thus circumventing Supreme Court rulings.
There were other less substantial allegations including lack of
26 See Hearings on Nomination of George Harrold Carswell of Florida to be
Associate justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate
Comm on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970). See also REPoRT oF
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candor before the Senate Judiciary Committee (which had also
been raised against Judge Haynsworth) but all of these were
soon supplanted by what became the real issue-that is, did
Carswell possess the requisite distinction for elevation to the
High Court.
In attempting to determine by what standards Judge Carswell

should be judged, some who had been very much involved in the
Haynsworth debate attempted to define the standards which
had been applied to the previous nominee. Kentucky's Marlow
Cook called his standard the "Haynsworth test" and subsequently
defined it as composed of essentially five elements, (1) competence; (2) achievement; (3) temperament; (4) judicial propriety and (5) non-judicial record.
Judge Haynsworth himself would not have passed this test
had he in fact been guilty of some ethical impropriety-that is,
if his judicial integrity had been compromised by violations of
any existing standard of conduct. His record of achievement
was only attacked by a few misinformed columnists and never
really became an issue. And his competence, temperament and
the record of his life off the bench was never questioned, but a
breakdown in any of these areas might have been fatal also.
The judicial integrity component of the "Haynsworth test,"
previously described as a violation of existing standards of conduct
for federal judges, was never in question in the Carswell proceedings. It was impossible for him to encounter difficulties similar
to those of Judge Haynsworth because he owned no stocks and
had not been involved in any business ventures through which a
conflict might arise. Certainly, his non-judicial record was never
questioned, nor was it a factor raised against any nominee in this
century. Disqualifying non-judicial activities referred to here
could best be illustrated by examples such as violations of federal
or state law, or personal problems such as alcoholism or drug
addiction-in other words, debilitating factors only indirectly related to effectiveness on the bench.
However, all the other criteria of the "Haynsworth test" were
raised in the Carswell case and caused Senators seeking to make
an objective appraisal of the nominee some difficulty. First, as to
the question of competence, a Ripon Society Report and a study
of the nominee's reversal percentages by a group of Columbia
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law students revealed that while a U.S. District Judge he had
been reversed more than twice as often as the average federal
district judge and that he ranked sixty-first in reversals among
the 67 federal trial judges in the south. Numerous reversals alone
might not have been a relevant factor; he could have been in the
vanguard of his profession some argued. This defense, however,
ignored simple facts about which even a first year law student
would be aware. A federal district judge's duty in most instances
is to follow the law as laid down by higher authority. Carswell
appeared to have a chronic inability to do this. No comparable
performance was ever imputed to Judge Haynsworth even by
his severest critics.
Second, in the area of achievement, he was totally lacking.
He had no publications, his opinions were rarely cited by other
judges in their opinions, and no expertise in any area of the
law was revealed. On the contrary, Judge Haynsworth's opinions
were often cited, and he was a recognized expert in several fields
including patents and trademarks, habeas corpus cases, and labor
law. In addition, his opinions on Judicial administration were
highly valued; he had been called upon to testify before Senator
Tydings' subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
on this subject in June of 1969.
In addition to his lack of professional distinction, Judge Carswell's temperament was also questionable. There was unrebutted
testimony before the Judiciary Committee that he was hostile
to a certain class of litigants-namely, those involved in litigation
to insure the right to vote to all citizens regardless of race pursuant to the Voting Rights Act of 1965. There had been testimony that Judge Haynsworth was anti-labor and anti-civil rights,
but these charges alleged not personal antipathy but rather
philosophical bias in a certain direction such as Justice Goldberg
might have been expected to exhibit against management in labor
cases. Such philosophical or ideological considerations, as pointed
out earlier, are more properly a concern of the President and not
the Senate, which should sit in judgment upon qualifications only.

And finally, a telling factor possibly revealing something
about both competence and temperament was Judge Carswell's
inability to secure the support of his fellow judges on the Fifth
Circuit. By contrast, all Fifth Circuit judges had supported Judge

KENTUCKY LAW JouRNAL[Vl5

[Vol. 59

Homer Thornberry when he was nominated in the waning months
of the Johnson presidency, even though that was not considered
an outstanding appointment by many in the country. All judges
of the Fourth Circuit had readily supported Judge Haynsworth's
nomination. Therefore, it was highly unusual and significant
that Judge Carswell could not secure the support of his fellow
judges, especially when one considers that they must have assumed at that time that they would have to deal with him continually in future years should his nomination not be confirmed.
His subsequent decision to leave the bench and run for political
office in Florida seeking to convert a wave of sympathy over
his frustrated appointment into the consolation prize of a United
States Senate seat only tended to confirm the worst suspicions
about his devotion to being a member of the Federal Judiciary.
Judge Carswell, then, fell short in three of the five essential
criteria evolving out of the Haynsworth case. This compelled a
no vote by the junior Senator from Kentucky and he was joined
by several other Senators who simply could not, in good conscience, vote to confirm despite the wishes of most of their constituents. Of the southern Senators who had supported Haynsworth, Spong, of Virginia, and Fulbright, of Arkansas, switched.
Gore, of Tennessee and Yarborough, of Texas, voted no again
and the only Democrat outside the south of liberal credentials
who had supported the Haynsworth nomination, Gravel, of
Alaska, joined the opponents this time.
Judge Carswell was defeated 51-45 on April 8, 1970 by essentially the same coalition which had stopped Judge Haynsworth.
The justification for opposition, however, as this article seeks to
demonstrate, was much sounder. Some undoubtedly voted in
favor of Carswell simply because he was a southern conservative.
Others, no doubt, voted no for the same reason. The key Senators
who determined his fate, however, clearly cast their votes against
the Hruska maxim that mediocrity was entitled to a seat on the
Supreme Court.
HARRY

M.

BIAcimuN: CONFIRMATION AT LAST

The political problem, therefore, is that so much must be
explained in distinguishing between Haynsworth and Black-
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mun, and when the explanations are made there is still room
for the political argument that Haynsworth should have been
confirmed in the first place.
Richard Wilson
Washington Evening Star

April 20, 1970
President Nixon next sent to the Senate to fill the vacancy of
almost one year created by the Fortas resignation a childhood
friend of Chief Justice Warren Burger, his first court appointment,
Judge Harry A. Blackmun, of Minnesota and the Eighth Circuit.
Judge Blackmun had an initial advantage which Judges Haysworth
and Carswell had not enjoyed-he was not from the South. Once
again, in judging the nominee it is appropriate to apply Senator
Cook's "Haynsworth test."
Judge Blackmun's competence, temperament, and non-judicial
record were quickly established by those charged with the
responsibility of reviewing the nomination, 7 and were, in any
event, never questioned, as no one asked the Judiciary Committee
for the opportunity to be heard in opposition to the nomination.
In the area of achievement or distinction, Judge Blackmun
was completely satisfactory. He had published three legal
articles: "The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota;" 2
"The Physician and His Estate;"2 9 and "Allowance of In Forma
Pauperis in Section 2255 and Habeas Corpus Cases." 0 In addition, at the time of his selection he was chairman of the Advisory
Committee on the Judge's Function of the American Bar Association Special Committee on Standards for the Administration of
Criminal Justice. Moreover, he had achieved distinction in the
areas of federal taxation and medico-legal problems and was
considered by colleagues of the bench and bar to be an expert in
these fields.
The only question raised about Judge Blackmun was in the
27

See Hearings on Nomination of Harry A. Blackmun of Minnesota to be
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the Senate
Comm.
2 8 on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess. (1970).
Blackmun, The Marital Deduction and Its Use in Minnesota, 36 MINN. L.
REV. 2 50
9 (1951).
Blackmun, The Physician and His Estate 36 Mmm. MED. 1033 (1953)
30 Blackmun, Allowance of In Forma Pauperis in Section 2255 and Habeas
Corpus Cases, 43 F.R.D. 343 (1968).
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area of judicial integrity or ethics. Judge Blackmun, since his
appointment to the Eighth Circuit by President Eisenhower in
1959, had sat in three cases in which he actually owned stock in
one of the litigants before him: Hanson v. Ford Motor Co.,31
Kotula v. Ford Motor Co.,32 and Mahoney v. Northwestern Bell
Telephone Co. 33 In a fourth case, Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co. v. Superior Insulating Co. 4 Judge Blackmun acting
similarly to Judge Haynsworth in Brunswick, bought shares of
one of the litigants after the decision but before the denial of a
petition for rehearings.
As previously mentioned, Judge Haynsworth's participation in
Brunswick was criticized as violating the spirit of Canon 29 and
the literal meaning of Formal Opinion 170 of the ABA, thus showing an insensitivity to judicial ethics, but Judge Blackmun
acted similarly in the 3M case and was not so criticized.
Except as it could be argued in Brunswick, Judge Haynsworth
never sat in a case in which he owned stock in one of the litigants
but, rather, three cases in which he merely owned stock in the
parent corporation of the litigant-subsidiary, a situation not unethical under any existing standard, or even by the wildest stretch
of any legal imaginations, except those of the anti-Haynsworth
leadership.
Judge Blackmun, on the other hand, committed a much more
clear-cut violation of what could be labelled the "Bayh standard."
Senator Bayh, the leader of the opposition in both the Haynsworth
and Carswell cases, ignored this breach of his Haynsworth test
with the following interesting justification:
He [Blackmun] discussed his stock holdings with Judge Johnson, then Chief Judge of the Circuit, who advised him that
his holdings did not constitute a "substantial interest" under
28 USC 455, and that he was obliged to sit in the case. There
is no indication that Judge Haynsworth ever disclosed his
financial interest to any colleague or to any party who might
have felt there was an apparent conflict, before sitting in such
case.35 [Emphasis added.]
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32338 F.2d 732 (8th
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Judge Haynsworth did not inform the lawyers because under
existing Fourth Circuit practice he found no significant interest
and, thus, no duty to disclose to the lawyers. In any event, Judge
Blackmun did not inform any of the lawyers in any of the cases
in which he sat, either. Judge Blackmun asked the chief judge
his advice and relied upon it. Judge Haynsworth was the chief
judge.
Chief Judge Johnson and Chief Judge Haynsworth both
interpreted that standard, as it existed, not as the Senator from
Indiana later fashioned it. That interpretation was, as the supporters of Judge Haynsworth said it was, and in accord with
Chief Judge Johnson who described the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 to be "that a judge should sit regardless of interest, so long
as the decision will not have a significant effect upon the value
of the judge's interest." 6
In other words, it is not interest in the litigant but interest
in the outcome of the litigation which requires stepping aside.
But even if it were interest in the litigant, the interests of Blackmun were de minimis and the interests of Haynsworth were not
only de minimis, but were one step removed-that is, his interest
was in the parent corporation where the subsidiary was the
litigant. Furthermore, the case law, what little there is, and
prevailing practice dictate that in the parent-subsidiary situation
there is no duty to step aside.
As John Frank pointed out to the Judiciary Committee during
the Haynsworth hearings, where there is no duty to step aside,
there is a duty to sit. Judge Haynsworth and Judge Blackmun
sat in these cases because under existing standards, not the
convenient ad hoc standard of the Haynsworth opponents, they
both had a duty to sit. But it is worth noting that if one were to
require a strict adherence to the most rigid standard-Formal
Opinion 170, which states that a judge shall not sit in a case in
which he owns stock in a party litigant-Judge Haynsworth whom
Senator Bayh opposed had only one arguable violation, Brunswick, while Judge Blackmun whom Senator Bayh supported had
one arguable violation, 3M, and three clear violations, Hanson,
Kotula and Mahoney.
The Senator from Indiana also argued that since fudge Black36 Id.
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mun stepped aside in Bridgemanv. Gateway Ford Truck Sales,3 7
arising after the Haynsworth affair, a situation in which he owned
stock in the parent Ford which totally owned one of the subsidiary-litigants, he "displayed a laudable recognition of the
changing nature of the standards of judicial conduct.""' Of
course, Judge Blackmun stepped aside after seeing what Judge
Haynsworth had been subjected to. Haynsworth did not have an
opportunity to step aside in such situations since this new Bayh
rule was established during the course of his demise. Certainly
Judge Haynsworth would now comply with the Bayh test to avoid
further attacks upon his judicial integrity just as Judge Blackmun
wisely did in Bridgeman.
It is clear, then, to any objective reviewer, that the Haynsworth
and Blackmun cases, aside from the political considerations involved, were virtually indistinguishable. If anything, Judge
Blackmun had much more flagrantly violated that standard used
to defeat Judge Haynsworth than had Judge Haynsworth. However, Judge Blackmun violated no existing standard worthy of
denying him confirmation and he was quite properly confirmed
by the Senate on May 12, 1970 by a vote of 88 to 0.

A NEw TEST: CAN ONE BE CoDmIMn?
Bad laws, if they exist, should be repealed as soon as possible,
still, while they continue in force, for the sake of example
they should be religiously observed.
Abraham Lincoln
It has been demonstrated that Judges Haynsworth and Blackmun violated no existing standards worthy of denying either of
them confirmation. Judge Carswells defeat, like Judge Haynsworth's, was also due in part to the application of a new standard
-it having been argued that mediocre nominees had been confirmed in the past, a fortiori Carswell should be also. Yet, certainly achievement was always a legitimate part of the Senate's
consideration of a nominee for confirmation just as ethics had
37
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always been. The Senate simply ignored mediocrity at various
times in the past and refused to do so in the case of Carswell.
And in the case of Haynsworth it made up an unrealistic standard
of judicial propriety to serve its political purposes and then
ignored those standards later in regard to Judge Blackmun
because politics dictated confirmation.
Possibly, new standards should be adopted by the Senate
but, of course, adopted prospectively in the absence of a
pending nomination and not in the course of confirmation
proceedings. In this regard, Senator Bayh has now introduced
two bills, The Judicial Disqualification Act of 1970 and the Omnibus Disclosure Act which, if enacted, would codify the standards
he previously employed to defeat Judge Haynsworth. This legislative effort is an admission that the previously applied standards
were nonexistent at the time. Those bills are, however, worthy
of serious consideration in a continuing effort to improve judicial
standards of conduct. Some standards have been suggested here
and will be recounted again but first some observations about
the body which must apply them.
First, it is safe to say that anti-southern prejudice is still very
much alive in the land and particularly in the Senate. Although
this alone did not cause the defeats of Haynsworth and Carswell,
it was a major factor. The fact that so many Senators were willing

to create a new ethical standard for Judge Haynsworth in November, 1969, in order to insure his defeat and then ignore even
more flagrant violations of this newly established standard in
May of 1970, can only be considered to demonstrate sectional
prejudice.
Another ominous aspect of the past year's events has been
that we have seen yet another example of the power of the press
over the minds of the people. As Wendell Phillips once commented, "We live under a government of men and morning
newspapers." Certainly, one should not accuse the working press
of distorting the news. The reporters were simply conveying to
the nation the accusations of the Senator from Indiana and others
in the opposition camp. These accusations were interpreted by
a misinformed public outside the south (as indicated by prominent
public opinion polls) as conclusive proof of Judge Haynsworth's
impropriety and Judge Carswell's racism, neither of which was
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ever substantiated. The press should remain unfettered, but
public figures must continue to have the courage to stand up to
those who would use it for their own narrow political advantage
to destroy men's reputations, and more importantly, the aura of
dignity which should properly surround the Supreme Court.
Some good, however, has come from this period. Senatorial
assertion against an all-powerful Executive, whoever he may be,
whether it is in foreign affairs or in Supreme Court appointments,
is healthy for the country. Such assertions help restore the constitutional checks and balances between our branches of government, thereby helping to preserve our institutions and maximize
our freedom.
In addition, the American Bar Association has indicated a
willingness to review its ethical standards and has appointed a
Special Committee on Standards of Judicial Conduct, under the
chairmanship of Judge Traynor, which issued a Preliminary Statement and Interim Report which would update the ABA Canons
of Judicial Ethics. This report was discussed in public hearings
on August 8th and 10th, 1970 at the Annual Meeting of the ABA
in St. Louis and may be placed on the agenda for consideration
at the February, 1971, mid-year meeting of the House of Delegates. Both supporters and opponents of Judge Haynsworth
agreed that a review and overhaul of the ABA's Canons of
Judicial Ethics was needed. This should be valuable and useful
to the Senate as the Judiciary Committee under Senator Eastland
has made a practice of requesting reports on Presidential nominees to the Supreme Court by the Standing Committee on the
Federal Judiciary of the ABA. This practice probably should be
continued as the Senate has not, in any way, delegated its
decision upon confirmation to this outside organization. Rather,
it seeks the views of the ABA before reporting nominees to the
Judiciary to the floor of the Senate just as any committee would
seek the views of relevant outside groups before proposing
legislation.
Although not central to the considerations of this article, it
should be noted what the Executive may have learned from this
period. President Johnson undoubtedly discovered in the Fortas
and Thormberry nominations that the Senate could be very
reluctant at times to approve nominees who might be classified

1970]

A NEw SENATE

STANDARD OF ExcEmL-N c

as personal friends or "cronies" of the Executive. It was also
established that the Senate would frown upon Justices of the
Supreme Court acting as advisors to the President as a violation
of the concept of separation of powers. This argument was used
very effectively against the elevation of Justice Fortas to the
Chief Justiceship as he had been an advisor to President Johnson
on a myriad of matters during his tenure on the Court. President Nixon learned during the Carswell proceedings that a
high degree of competence would likely be required by the
Senate before it approved future nominees. He also learned
during the Haynsworth case that the Senate would likely require
strict adherence to standards of judicial propriety.
Unfortunately, as a result of this episode, the Administration
has adopted a very questionable practice in regard to future
nominations to the Supreme Court. Attorney General John N.
Mitchell announced on July 28, 1970 that the Justice Department
would adopt a new procedure under which the Attorney General
will seek a complete investigation by the ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary before recommending anyone
to the President for nomination to the Supreme Court. This
Committee has already enjoyed virtually unprecedented influence
in the selection of U.S. District and Circuit Judges as this Administration has made no nominations to these Courts which
have not received the prior approval of this twelve man Committee. In effect, the Administration, after delegating to this
Committee veto power over lower federal court appointments,
has now broadened this authority to cover its selections to the
Supreme Court. Complete delegation of authority to an outside
organization of so awesome a responsibility as designating men
to our federal District and Circuit Courts is bad enough, but such
a delegation of authority to approve, on the Supreme Court level,
is most unwise. Far from representing all lawyers in the country,
the ABA has historically been the repository of "big-firm,"
"defense-oriented," "corporate-type lawyers" who may or may
not make an objective appraisal of a prospective nominee.
if President Wilson had asked the ABA for prior approval of
Brandeis, the Supreme Court and the nation would never have
benefitted from his great legal talents. The presumption that
such an outside organization as the American Bar Association is
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better able to pass upon the credentials of nominees for the
federal courts and especially the Supreme Court than the President of the United States who is given the constitutional authority
is an erroneous judgment which the passage of time will hopefully
see reversed.3 9 This is not to imply that ABA views would not
be useful to the Executive in its considerations just as they are
useful to but not determinative of the actions of the Senate (the
Senate having rejected ABA approved nominees Haynsworth and
Carswell).
What standard then can be drawn for the Senate from the
experiences of the past year in advising and consenting to
Presidential nominations to the Supreme Court? They have been
set out above but should be reiterated in conclusion. At the
outset, the Senate should discount the philosophy of the nominee.
In our politically centrist society, it is highly unlikely that any
Executive would nominate a man of such extreme views of the
right of the left as to be disturbing to the Senate. However, a
nomination, for example, of a Communist or a member of the
American Nazi Party, would have to be considered an exception
to the recommendation that the Senate leave ideological considerations to the discretion of the Executive. Political and
philosophical considerations were often a factor in the nineteenth
century and arguably in the Parker, Haynsworth and Carswell
cases also, but this is not proper and tends to degrade the Court
and dilute the constitutionally proper authority of the Executive
in this area. The President is presumably elected by the people to
carry out a program and altering the ideological directions of
the Supreme Court would seem to be a perfectly legitimate part
of a Presidential platform. To that end, the Constitution gives to
him the power to nominate. As mentioned earlier, if the power
to nominate had been given to the Senate, as was considered
during the debates at the Constitutional Convention, then it
would be proper for the Senate to consider political philosophy.
The proper role of the Senate is to advise and consent to the
particular nomination, and thus, as the Constitution puts it, "to
appoint." This taken within the context of modern times should
39 But
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mean an examination only into the qualifications of the President's nominee.
In examining the qualifications of a Supreme Court nominee,
use of the following criteria is recommended. First, the nominee
must be judged competent. He should, of course, be a lawyer
although the Constitution does not require it. Judicial experience might satisfy the Senate as to the nominee's competence,
although the President should certainly not be restricted to
naming sitting judges. Legal scholars as well as practicing
lawyers might well be found competent.
Second, the nominee should be judged to have obtained some
level of achievement or distinction. After all, it is the Supreme
Court the Senate is considering not the police court in Hoboken,
N.J. or even the U.S. District or Circuit Courts. This achievement
could be established by writings, but the absence of publications
alone would not be fatal. Reputation at the bar and bench would
be significant. Quality of opinions if a sitting judge, or appellate
briefs if a practicing attorney, or articles or books if a law professor might establish the requisite distinction. Certainly, the
acquisition of expertise in certain areas of the law would be an
important plus in determining the level of achievement of the
nominee.
Third, temperament could be significant. Although difficult
to establish and not as important as the other criteria, temperament might become a factor where, for example in the case of
Carswell, a sitting judge was alleged to be hostile to a certain
class of litigants or abusive to lawyers in the courtroom.
Fourth, the nominee, if a judge, must have violated no
existing standard of ethical conduct rendering him unfit for
confirmation. If the nominee is not a judge, he must not have
violated the Canons of Ethics and statutes which apply to conduct
required of members of the bar. If a law professor, he must be
free of violations of ethical standards applicable to that profession, for example plagiarism.
Fifth and finally, the nominee must have a clean record in
his life off the bench. He should be free from prior criminal
conviction and not the possessor of debilitating personal problems
such as alcoholism or drug abuse. However, this final criterion
would rarely come into play due to the intensive personal investi-

34
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gations customarily employed by the Executive before nominations are sent to the Senate.
In conclusion, these criteria for Senate judgment of nominees
to the Supreme Court are recommended for future considerations.
It will always be difficult to obtain a fair and impartial judgment
from such an inevitably political body as the United States Senate.
However, it is suggested that the true measure of a statesman
may well be the ability to rise above partisan political considerations to objectively pass upon another aspiring human being.
While the author retains no great optimism for their future usage,
these guidelines are now, nevertheless, left behind, a fitting
epilogue hopefully to a most unique and unforgettable era in the
history of the Supreme Court.

